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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 
 
 
 
CVG-SAB, LLC, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
FACEBOOK INC.  
 
 Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Case No.:  2:12-cv-14521 
 
 
COMPLAINT 
 
Plaintiff CVG-SAB, LLC, for its complaint against Defendant Facebook Inc., alleges as 
follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Plaintiff uses and owns WANT as a trademark in connection with services that 
allow Internet users to express their purchase intent for products and services offered on the sites 
of Plaintiff’s customers and on Plaintiff’s site. Plaintiff’s WANT services are activated when 
Internet users click on Plaintiff’s WANT Button near a desired product and/or service. By doing 
so, consumers create and add to a comprehensive list of their preferred products and services. 
Plaintiff has spent substantial time, money, and effort developing its WANT Button services and 
in creating, maintaining, and strengthening the source-identifying goodwill associated with its 
WANT Button services. 
2. Just days ago, Facebook introduced a WANT Button for services that are 
effectively the same as, or at least closely related to, Plaintiff’s WANT Button services. 
Facebook’s unauthorized use of Plaintiff’s WANT mark has already caused actual confusion in 
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the marketplace, to Plaintiff’s substantial and irreparable harm. Facebook’s conduct is 
intentional, as it had prior knowledge of Plaintiff’s use of, and superior rights in, Plaintiff’s 
WANT mark. Despite such knowledge, Facebook forged ahead in disregard of Plaintiff’s 
trademark rights. 
3. This Complaint seeks full legal and equitable redress for Facebook’s violations of 
the Lanham Act, the Common Law of the State of Michigan, and the Michigan Consumer 
Protection Act. 
PARTIES 
4. Plaintiff is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the state of 
Michigan, with a principal place of business in Farmington Hills, Michigan.  
5. On information and belief, Facebook is a corporation organized under the laws of 
the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Palo Alto, California. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 1121, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1338, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Facebook in that Facebook 
has engaged in, and continues to engage in, the transaction of business and in the commission of 
tortious acts in interstate commerce and in Michigan. Facebook’s business and acts have caused, 
and continue to cause, injury to Plaintiff within the State of Michigan. 
8. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and/or (b). 
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PLAINTIFF’S BUSINESS AND ITS ‘WANT’ MARK 
9. Plaintiff is a social media company that contracts with Internet retail merchants, 
and does business directly with Internet users, to allow users to express their purchasing intent 
for products and services offered by Internet merchants. Plaintiff does business under the trade 
names Want Technologies, WantButton, Want, TheWantlist, and The Want List.  
10. Since at least as early as September 16, 2010, Plaintiff has used WANT as a mark 
in connection with an electronic button that is placed on the website of Plaintiff’s customers 
(Internet merchants) next to their products and services. Internet merchants who are interested in 
Plaintiff’s WANT Button services can contract with Plaintiff through Plaintiff’s website 
http://www.wantbutton.com. Upon agreeing to Plaintiff’s Terms of Services, Plaintiff’s 
customers can place Plaintiff’s WANT Button on their websites for use by visitors. An example 
of Plaintiff’s WANT Button on one of its customers’ sites (Tommy Bahama) is shown below: 
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11. When a visitor sees a product or service of interest, the visitor can click on 
Plaintiff’s nearby WANT Button to indicate a preference or purchasing intent for the product or 
service. Every item added by clicking on Plaintiff’s WANT Button can be posted to the user’s 
profile on www.wanttt.com and on Facebook’s Timeline. Thus, Plaintiff’s WANT Button 
services allow consumers to keep a universal list of desired products and services in a central 
location.  
12. Plaintiff’s customers include well-known companies with some of the most 
highly-trafficked sites on the web today, including: Tommy Bahama; Burlington Coat Factory; 
Sharper Image; Calico Corners; Dermstore; frederick’s of Hollywood; acer; and Plow & Hearth. 
Screen shots of these companies’ use of Plaintiff’s WANT Button are collected at Exh. A. 
13. Plaintiff also operates http://www.wanttt.com, where Internet users can click on 
Plaintiff’s WANT Button to indicate a preference or purchasing intent for products or services 
offered by Plaintiff’s customers. A representative screen shot from Plaintiff’s site is shown 
below: 
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14. Plaintiff and its customers have used Plaintiff’s WANT Button as a mark 
continuously since the date of first use. Since Plaintiff introduced its WANT Button services, 
Plaintiff’s WANT Button services have enjoyed substantial commercial success and exposure. 
For example: 
a. Over 160 million WANT Button views; 
b. Over 40 million consumer visits to merchant sites that include Plaintiff’s WANT 
Button; and 
c. Over 28 million unique consumer visits to merchant sites that include Plaintiff’s 
WANT Button.  
15. Because of (among other things) the length of time of Plaintiff’s and its 
customers’ exclusive, continuous, and prominent use of its WANT Button, and the great number 
of commercial impressions of the WANT Button, Plaintiff’s WANT Button service mark is a 
source-identifying symbol that enjoys substantial goodwill among Plaintiff’s customers and 
Internet users. Plaintiff uses, and permits its customers to use, its WANT Button service mark as 
a source-indicating vehicle to distinguish Plaintiff’s services from others. Such use vests in 
Plaintiff substantial common-law rights in its WANT Button service mark. 
PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATIONS 
AND APPLICATIONS FOR ITS ‘WANT’ MARK 
16. Plaintiff owns two US trademark registrations for WANT, in standard characters, 
for use in connection with various aspects of e-commerce that directly relate to and support 
Plaintiff’s business. The marks are registered on the Principal Register. More specifically: 
a. On September 4, 2012, the US Patent & Trademark Office issued US Trademark 
No. 4,200,861 (Exh. B) for WANT for use in connection with the goods and/or 
services listed therein, including: “managing a computer-based system that 
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24. Other retailers through which Facebook uses a WANT Button are: Wayfair.com; 
Victoria’s Secret, Michael Kors, Smith Optics, and Fab.com. 
25. Plaintiff has not consented to, licensed, permitted, or authorized Facebook’s use 
of the WANT Button. 
26. On information and belief, Facebook adopted and uses its WANT Button to 
mislead and confuse consumers into believing that either: (a) by virtue of its size and market 
penetration, Facebook is the senior user of the WANT Button and that all others are unauthorized 
junior users; or (b) the services offered by Facebook under the WANT Button originate from 
Plaintiff, are affiliated, connected, or associated with Plaintiff, or are sponsored or approved by 
Plaintiff. 
FACEBOOK’S UNLAWFUL CONDUCT HAS ALREADY CAUSED ACTUAL CONFUSION 
27. Despite the fact that Facebook has only recently launched a WANT Button, there 
have already been instances of actual confusion in the marketplace. For example: 
a. On October 8, 2012, Plaintiff received an email from an individual who included 
a link to an article on huffingtonpost.com about Facebook’s introduction of a 
WANT Button. The subject of the email was “WANT button in the news!” The 
author of the email wrote: 
I saw that the WANT button ended up in the Huffington Post today, but 
they’re calling it Collections? Is this something different than your 
platform? 
 
The article is at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/08/facebook-want-
button_n_1949366.html?utm_hp_ref=technology. 
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b. On October 9, 2012, Plaintiff received an email with the Subject heading 
“Facebook Begins Testing ‘Want’ Button,” and a link to an article on 
Dailytech.com. The author asked: 
Is this you??? If so, WOW!! 
 
The article is at 
http://www.dailytech.com/Facebook+Begins+Testing+Want+Button/article27885
.htm. 
c. On October 9, 2012, Plaintiff received an email that included a link to an article 
on businessinsider.com that had come out earlier that day. The author of the email 
said: 
[S]aw this come out earlier. What’s the future of wantbutton.com? Looks 
similar to what FB just launched. 
 
The article is at: http://www.businessinsider.com/what-facebooks-want-button-
will-look-like-2012-10.  
FACEBOOK HAS EMBARKED ON ITS UNLAWFUL CONDUCT WITH ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
OF PLAINTIFF’S USE OF, AND SUPERIOR RIGHTS IN, PLAINTIFF’S ‘WANT’ BUTTON 
28. On information and belief, Facebook had actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s use of, 
and superior rights in, Plaintiff’s WANT Button services at least as early as September 2011. In 
that month, Facebook announced its Timeline Integration. That same month, Plaintiff promptly 
applied with Facebook for integration of its WANT Button services, and in the process, notified 
Facebook of Plaintiff’s WANT Button services. Facebook approved Plaintiff’s application in 
February 2012. 
29. Moreover, on December 8, 2011, a representative of Facebook’s Legal 
Department contacted Plaintiff to address Plaintiff’s use of Facebook’s “ ” logo near 
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Plaintiff’s WANT Button services. (See Exh. F.) She wrote: “I write regarding your promotion 
of your ‘Want’ button using our highly recognizable F logo.” (Emphasis added.) Facebook 
expressed its concern that Plaintiff’s use of the logo made it look as if Plaintiff’s WANT Button 
service was “an official Facebook application[] or endorsed or sponsored by Facebook.” 
Facebook continued, “It is in both our interest that you develop your own distinctive branding.” 
She then advised (among other things) that “you may not combine our F logo with your logo, or 
incorporate our logo into the lockups for your ‘want’ button.” (Emphasis added.)  
30. Later that day, within just hours after receiving Facebook’s communication, 
Plaintiff explained that it used Facebook’s logo in the good faith believe that the use complied 
with Facebook’s guidelines but that the guidelines had apparently changed. Regardless, Plaintiff 
immediately and fully complied with Facebook’s request.  
31. Facebook responded favorably five days later, on December 13, 2011: “Thank 
you very much for your message and your prompt action to resolve this matter.” 
32. Therefore, at least as early as December 8, 2011, Facebook – and Facebook’s 
Legal Department, no less – had actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s then-existing use of Plaintiff’s 
WANT Button services. Moreover, Facebook’s knowledge resulted from an evaluation of the 
intellectual property issues raised by Plaintiff’s use of Facebook’s trademark.  
 
COUNT I: 
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT, IN VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) 
33. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 32 above as though 
fully set forth herein. 
34. Facebook’s unlawful conduct set forth above is likely to cause confusion (forward 
or reverse), to cause mistake, and/or to deceive the public, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). 
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35. Facebook’s unlawful conduct set forth above in disregard of Plaintiff’s superior 
rights has been knowing, intentional, and willful. 
36. Plaintiff has suffered, and is likely to continue suffering, financial and other harm 
and injury, including irreparable harm and injury, if Facebook is not temporarily, preliminarily , 
and permanently enjoined from continuing its unlawful conduct set forth above. 
COUNT II: 
FALSE DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN, IN VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1125(A) 
  
37. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 36 above as though 
fully set forth herein. 
38. Facebook has used, and is using, a false designation or origin that is likely to 
cause confusion, to cause mistake, and/or to deceive the relevant public as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of Facebook with Plaintiff, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of its WANT services by Plaintiff, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
39. Facebook’s unlawful conduct set forth above in disregard of Plaintiff’s superior 
rights has been knowing, intentional, and willful. 
40. Plaintiff has suffered, and is likely to continue suffering, financial and other harm 
and injury, including irreparable harm and injury, if Facebook is not temporarily, preliminarily , 
and permanently enjoined from continuing its unlawful conduct set forth above. 
COUNT III: 
COMMON LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION 
 
41. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 above as though 
fully set forth herein. 
42. Facebook has competed, and continues to compete, unfairly with Plaintiff by its 
unlawful conduct set forth above, in violation of Michigan common law. 
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43. Facebook’s unlawful conduct set forth above in disregard of Plaintiff’s superior 
rights has been knowing, intentional, and willful. 
44. Plaintiff has suffered, and is likely to continue suffering, financial and other harm 
and injury, including irreparable harm and injury, if Facebook is not temporarily, preliminarily , 
and permanently enjoined from continuing its unlawful conduct set forth above. 
COUNT IV: 
COMMON LAW TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
45. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 44 above as though 
fully set forth herein. 
46. Facebook has infringed Plaintiff’s trademark rights, and continues to infringe 
Plaintiff’s trademark rights, by its unlawful conduct set forth above, in violation of Michigan 
common law. 
47. Facebook’s unlawful conduct set forth above in disregard of Plaintiff’s superior 
rights has been knowing, intentional, and willful. 
48. Plaintiff has suffered, and is likely to continue suffering, financial and other harm 
and injury, including irreparable harm and injury, if Facebook is not temporarily, preliminarily , 
and permanently enjoined from continuing its unlawful conduct set forth above. 
COUNT V: 
VIOLATION OF THE MICHIGAN CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.903 
49. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 48 above as though 
fully set forth herein. 
50. As a result of its unlawful actions set forth above, Facebook has violated, and 
continues to violate, the Michigan Consumer Protection Act by engaging in unfair and deceptive 
methods, acts, and practices in the conduct of trade or commerce. 
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51. Facebook’s unfair and deceptive methods, acts, and practices have the effects of 
(1) causing a probability of confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, 
approval, or certification of the WANT Button services offered by Facebook; and (2) falsely 
representing that the WANT Button services offered by Facebook have the sponsorship or 
approval of Plaintiff. 
52. Facebook’s unlawful conduct set forth above in disregard of Plaintiff’s superior 
rights has been knowing, intentional, and willful. 
53. Plaintiff has suffered, and is likely to continue suffering, financial and other harm 
and injury, including irreparable harm and injury, if Facebook is not temporarily, preliminarily , 
and permanently enjoined from continuing its unlawful conduct set forth above. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
THEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in its favor 
and against Facebook: 
A. Temporarily, preliminarily, and permanently enjoining Facebook, its officers, 
agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all other persons who are in active concert or 
participation with any of the above, from using as a mark Plaintiff’s WANT Button service mark 
– including its WANT Button – or any variation thereof, or any other designation that is 
confusingly similar to Plaintiff WANT mark; 
B. Temporarily, preliminarily, and permanently enjoining all entities that have 
contracted with Facebook to use Facebook’s infringing use of WANT as a mark; 
C. Directing Facebook to destroy any and all physical and electronic copies 
(including computer code) of the infringing WANT Button that is in Facebook’s possession, 
custody, or control; 
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D. Directing Facebook to instruct its customers to return to Facebook any and all 
physical and electronic copies of the infringing WANT Button that is in its customers’ 
possession, custody, or control for destruction by Facebook (as per C., above).  
E. Awarding Plaintiff its actual damages; 
F. Awarding Plaintiff the profits that Facebook has realized through its unlawful 
conduct; 
G. Awarding Plaintiff its attorneys fees and increasing the award of Plaintiff’s 
damages and/or Facebook’s profits by virtue of the exceptional nature of this case; 
H. Directing Facebook to pay all costs incurred by Plaintiff related to this 
proceeding; and 
I. Awarding such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
 
Dated: October 12, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/James K. Cleland   
James K. Cleland (P68507) 
jcleland@brinkshofer.com 
Michael N. Spink (P66527) 
mspink@brinkshofer.com 
Jon Beaupré (P66389) 
jbeaupre@brinkshofer.com 
BRINKS HOFER GILSON & LIONE 
524 S. Main Street, Suite 200 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104 
Tel: 734-302-6000 
 
John T. Gabrielides 
jtg@brinkshofer.com 
Jeffrey Catalano 
jcatalano@brinkshofer.com 
Andrew J. Avsec 
aavsec@brinkshofer.com 
Danielle Cendrowski 
dcendrowski@brinkshofer.com 
BRINKS HOFER GILSON & LIONE 
455 N. Cityfront Plaza Drive 
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Suite 3600 
Chicago, IL 60611 
Tel: 312-321-4200 
 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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